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KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF, AND REFERENCE: THEAETETUS 206c-210d
In the last pages of the Theaetetus, Plato considers and criticizes the claim that knowledge is true belief with an account; he rejects three senses of 'account' (logos) whose addition might, but does not, turn true belief into knowledge, and no satisfactory sense of 'account' is uncovered. I argue that the aporetic conclusion does not show that Plato has abandoned a commitment to a logos-based epistemology; he suggests an appropriate sense of 'account' in the course of criticizing the second sense of 'logos', arguing that knowledge consists in an ability systematically to interrelate various propositions. This interrelation model, as well as the theories of belief and reference suggested here, press the importance of descriptive content, to the neglect of ostension and causal or historical connections in the world.
GAIL FINE

Cornell University
ARISTOTLE: REFERENCE, REAL DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORIES
Two important strands in Aristotle's thought seem to be at odds: (1) he is a category theorist and pays great attention to logical form, but (2) he also believes that there are natural kinds and that essential properties need not be the properties most familiar to us or the experts. The first is mystifying in a realist unless he believes the categories of our conceptual systems must also be the categories of reality, but the second may suggest a resemblance to the picture of reference presented recently by Kripke and Putnam, which is incompatible with this. I argue that Aristotle differs profoundly from Kripke and Putnam on reference in a way that allows us to reconcile (1) and (2). The difference hinges on how each takes familiar characteristics to be related to essential properties. On Aristotle's view, reference cannot be rigid. JOAN 
KUNG
Marquette University
FREE WILL COULD IT REALLY HAVE BEEN OTHERWISE?
In this paper I argue that the belief that a given thing could have been other than what it in fact is, is highly metaphysical; that is to say, it is the sort of belief for which experience is not relevant, and, hence, it is intelligible only in the context of a larger metaphysical structure. This structure is atomism. I then explore the possibility of embedding the denial of the above belief (that a given thing could have been otherwise) in a non-atomistic framework, and argue that the consequences of so doing are more in accord with our humanitarian intuitions than is the belief in free will. NEAL 
GROSSMAN
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle SOCIAL FORCES, HUMAN ACTIONS
Historians and social scientists often claim to describe the influence of social forces or institutions upon the actions (work, views, assertions, etc.) of individual human agents. But is such "influence" supposed to be causal in nature? or can it be effective only via the motivation of the agents involved? It would seem that questions of this sort are important for theorists of human action in that they concern the relationship (s) between actions and the social contexts in which agents live. This essay seeks to clarify different "social-forces" claims about the actions, work, and assertions involved in the seventeenth-century scientific revolution. Particularly useful in interpreting one sort of claim is a role-rule approach to human action as elaborated by some recent social psychologists and action theorists. Briefly, this approach allows us to conceive a noncausal, nonmotivational role in human action for social forces, a role consistent with both individual human creativity and the social roots of agency. In a recent interesting paper,' Christopher Peacocke has proposed an epistemological criterion for an expression of a language characterized by a theory of satisfaction being a logical constant of that language. In this paper, I describe and criticize Peacocke's criterion. It is argued that the criterion fails to provide a sufficient condition of an expression's being a logical constant; moreover, the counterinstances adduced to show this make it probable that any satisfactory rehabilitation of the criterion must rely upon an independent solution to the problem at issue.
TIMOTHY MCCARTHY
University of Michigan
REPARSING AND ESSENTIALISM
Quine has argued that proper names can be reparsed as predicates and that essentialism is unacceptable, in particular as it pertains to modal logic. With regard to this I will attempt to establish the following: (a) that there are two respects in which the reparsing thesis implies essentialism; (b) that the reparsing thesis is inconsistent with modal logic.
The claim that essentialism is unacceptable is necessary to Quine's criticism of modal logic. Hence, the import of (a) is this: if (a) is true, then either proper names cannot be reparsed as predicates or the argument against modal logic in terms of essentialism fails.
Quine maintains that the reparsing thesis is neutral with regard to the acceptability of modal logic. It follows from (b) that this is false. So his argument for why modal logic is unacceptable should be not that it requires essentialism, but rather that it implies that proper names cannot be reparsed. which avoids them. The proposal amounts to accepting Hilary Putnam's "linguistic division of labor," but rejecting a general appeal to original dubbing acts and historical paradigms for natural kinds. I argue that we can assign reference and extension according to tests of currently acknowledged experts, while still preserving reference across theory change if we wish to do so. Reference always will be relative to current speakers' intentions to use terms in certain ways, but not relative to their false beliefs about objects to which they refer.
ALAN H. GOLDMAN
University of Miami
DEVIANT TRANSLATION
Quine has argued that translation of truth-functional connectives is (with some exceptions) determinate. In this paper the question is asked whether or not circumstances might exist in which one would do well to build a "deviant logic" into a translation manual and, if so, whether translation of logic would remain determinate. It is argued that such circumstances could exist and that, at least in some cases, translation of deviant logics would not be significantly less determinate than would translation of classical propositional logic. One standard model, or paradigm, used to justify the claim that "there might turn out to be no mental entities" is unable to support the conclusions often drawn from it. The difficulties confronting the eliminative materialist are highlighted by considering the position as developed and defended by Richard Rorty. It is argued: (1) Rorty fails to establish that incorrigibility is a unique "mark of the mental" and, consequently, has not justified the claim that empirical considerations could lead us to eliminate talk of the mental; and (2) the paradigm Rorty advances to justify the elimination of "mental entities" cannot be extended to cover both thoughts and sensations without sacrificing the required account of the "private" or "subjective" dimension of the mental. As a result, in order to defend eliminative materialism, one must either produce a wholly different and more general justification for elimination, or defend a restricted version incorporating a limited identity theory.
ROBERT RICHARDSON
University of Cincinnati
IV. ETHICS RULE UTILITARIANISM IN PARTIAL COMPLIANCE THEORY
It would not decrease the amount of good produced by universal obedience to a set of rules, to alter the rules by adding a provision that allows any act whatsoever to be done in case the rules have been disobeyed. Therefore rule utilitarianism as commonly formulated implies that, in case wrong has been done, any act whatsoever is right. This result is far graver than one to which David Lyons calls attention. The unwelcome consequence is avoided by the doctrine that an act is right if it conforms to a fair set of rules obedience to which by any and every portion of the population would produce at least as much good as obedience by that same portion to any alternative fair set of rules. Without the fairness requirement, this condition would be satisfied by the act-utilitarian maxim; with the requirement, it seems compatible with the spirit of rule utilitarianism.
-B.
C. POSTOW
University of Tennessee, Knoxville ALAN GEWIRTH AND THE MORAL LAW
In this paper I summarize (and clean up a bit) Gewirth's most recent attempt to ground moral obligation Kantian-style 1, expose its weaknesses, and try to eliminate them. Gewirth argues cleverly that, say, even a fanatical and racist Nazi's purposive action commits him to saying that all agents have the right to freedom and "basic well-being." I find a mistake here, but, by drawing an analogy between being Jewish and having a disease with self-concealing symptoms, suggest how the argument might be repaired. I weaken the rest of the argument enough not to imply that we ought to let murderers murder, and strengthen it enough to imply that we are obligated to persons who share none of our circumstances and purposes. I conclude that, but for the possibly reparable error, Gewirth's argument does indeed establish an absolute obligation, but only the obligation to observe other agents' rights to life and consciousness.
JOHN HOOKER
Vanderbilt University
PHILOSOPHY OF SARTRE SARTRE'S TRANSCENDENCE OF THE EGO:
A Persons are overwhelmingly the beings to whom moral considerations apply. It may therefore be supposed that being a person is itself a moral consideration. It has been claimed, for example, that the proper policy to adopt toward fetuses and the irreversibly comatose hinges on whether they are persons. In this paper I examine three types of construals of 'person' and argue that none provides a sense in which being a person is a morally relevant property. I conclude that no moral debate is likely to be advanced by determining whether some affected party is or is not a a person. In this paper, an argument is given supporting the thesis that existence is not an all-or-nothing affair. Attention first is focused upon the claim that objects have certain properties or attributes to different extents or degrees. The argument in behalf of the "degrees-of-being" thesis is then developed. The crucial assumption upon which the argument rests is that individuals have essential properties conforming to the "property-by-degree" thesis. In particular, the property of being a person is a likely candidate for the role of a property that is both essential to its bearers and also possessed to varying extents or degrees. 
PROPOSITIONS A NEW APPROACH TO PROPOSITIONS AND FACTS
A semantic theory is presented in which both language-independent propositions and facts have an integral role. The theory is extensional and model-theoretic, facts and propositions being explicated as ordered pairs whose constituents are extensions (objects and predicate-extension sets). Facts are ordered pairs (x,z)-including ordered n-tuples expressed thus-for which x is a member of z, and Propositions are ordered pairs of ordered pairs ((x,y), (x,z) )-such that (x,z) is a Fact-which are true if and only if (xy) = (x,z). Truth can thus be defined explicitly in the theory without danger from the semantic paradoxes.
Molecular Propositions can also be defined, and, furthermore, the theory allows for distinct but logically equivalent Propositions such as 'p' and 'p is true' (with a corresponding distinction for Facts), so that some standard objections to usual extensional conceptions of these entities can be avoided. Generally the theory provides a perspicuous rendering of semantic structure.
JOHN DILWORTH
Western Michigan University SENTENCES AND PROPOSITIONS
The recent view of proper names as simple designators or rigid designators seems to legitimatize substitution in intensional contexts of proper names that denote the same object. If we can substitute such expressions in intensional contexts, how are we to explain the seeming invalidity of arguments like the following?
(1) Jones believes that Tully is Tully.
(2) Cicero is Tully. Therefore (3) Jones believes that Cicero is Tully. I argue that, if names such as 'Cicero' and 'Tully' are simple designators, then the above argument is valid. The counterintuitiveness of accepting the validity of such arguments can be explained away by pointing out a distinction between sentences and propositions. By distinguishing between the objects of belief (i.e., propositions) and the way we express our beliefs (i.e., sentences in a language), one can see that the way we describe or characterize our beliefs is intimately connected with the language we speak. Hence, one can explain away what appear to be contradictory beliefs by reference to the language used to express those beliefs. In this way we can account for the validity of certain arguments that appear counterintuitive.
GREGORY FITCH
Arizona State University
